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ABSTRACT: The findings of a series of studies in the area of political communication 
during the 1990s questioned the answer media malaise offered for what was 
considered a constant in the academic debate: the negative relationship between 
media exposure and civic engagement. Some authors blame the media for 
"narcotizing" citizens, while other analysts say empirical evidence points to the 
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opposite direction. This article approaches empirically the compared Spanish and 
Brazilian cases. More specifically, the study presents an approach to the impact of 
media consumption on institutional trust. The results point to different impacts of 
the media in each country, brought by the peculiarities of their political systems, as 
well as differences in media consumption behavior. 
 
RESUMEN: Los hallazgos de una serie de trabajos desarrollados en el área de la 
comunicación política durante la década de los noventa, han venido a cuestionar la 
respuesta que el malestar mediático ofrecía en relación con un asunto configurado 
como una constante en el debate académico; la relación entre la exposición a los 
medios de comunicación y el compromiso político. Mientras algunos autores adscritos 
a la perspectiva clásica citada culpan a los medios de comunicación de haber 
“narcotizado” a los ciudadanos, otros analistas aseguran que la evidencia empírica 
apunta en la dirección contraria. Tomando como punto de referencia la discusión 
descrita, este artículo pretende aproximarse empíricamente de forma comparada a los 
casos español y brasileño. Más concretamente, el estudio presenta un acercamiento al 
impacto del consumo de medios de comunicación en la confianza institucional. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The media are an important source of political information in contemporary society and, 
therefore, an important variable to consider for the quality of democracy. More 
specifically, we argue their relevance in the study of the relationship between citizens and 
the political system, stressing that the way in which political issues are covered by the 
media influence political attitudes that they manifest. 
According to some theorists, the media would foster cynicism and distrust among 
citizens, as they focus on more negative aspects of political life. This adverse effect 
would also be driven by a changing society that has become increasingly more focused 
on television, a vehicle less able to cope with the more complex aspects of politics1. 
However, there are perspectives that interpret news media (print or electronic) as factors 
that provide information that encourages citizens’ engagement in democracy2. 
                                                 
1 Cfr. CAPPELLA, Joseph & JAMIESON, Kathleen, Spiral of Cynicism. The press and the public good, 
Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford, 1997; MERVIN, David, “The News Media and Democracy in 
the United States”, Democratization, vol. 5, Issue 2, 1998, pp. 6-22; PATTERSON, Thomas, “The United 
States: news in a free-market society”, in GUNTHER, Richard & MUGHAN, Anthony. (eds.), Democracy 
and the Media, a comparative perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 241-265. 
2 Cfr. NEWTON, Kenneth, “Mass Media Effects: Mobilization or Media Malaise?”, British Journal of 
Political Science, vol. 29, Issue 4, 1999, pp. 577-599; NORRIS, Pippa, “Impact of Television on Civil 
Malaise”, in PUTNAM, Robert & PHARR, Susan (eds.), Disaffected Democrats: What´s Troubling the 
Trilateral Democracies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000a, pp. 231-251. 
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Furthermore, there is also the perspective that the growing distrust in democratic regimes 
may be related to the ongoing processes of cognitive qualification of its citizens, brought 
about by cultural transformations that, in turn, have resulted from continuous cycles of 
economic development. Education, as well as information acquired from the media, 
would have this instruction role. Therefore, better-informed segments of society are more 
distrustful of institutions and are more critical of the regime's performance3. From this 
perspective, however, distrust would be seen as a healthy skepticism of institutions, rather 
than a syndrome that could affect the stability of democracy. 
Regardless of the adopted theoretical perspective concerning the role of mass 
communication, information about institutions conveyed by the media is part of the 
instruments available for the public to relate to them, beyond the specific experiences 
they may have. Therefore, what can be said about the role played by the media for the 
quality of democracy? More specifically, how is trust in democratic institutions affected 
by media exposure? 
Comparing selected case studies of two countries is an interesting approach to address 
this problem. Brazil and Spain share many social and cultural characteristics. Brazilian 
political culture is often described as having strong Iberian roots. Its transition to 
democracy is more or less recent, as the case of Spain, although occurring about a decade 
later. Despite cultural similarities, they differ in their political systems (presidential vs. 
parliamentarian), and in its media landscape. Brazil has higher illiteracy rates and, 
therefore, less newspaper readership, causing a greater reliance on television for political 
information. Having this in mind, could these differences produce different results in 
these two countries? 
 
 
 
2. Media and Democracy: mobilization or political disaffection? 
 
Among the different theoretical perspectives that exist in political communication –and 
ascribed the general label of media effects theory– we find the set of interpretations that 
serve as reference for the development of our study, that is, (de)mobilization theories4. 
These analyses allow us to explore the debate between political disaffection perspectives 
(also called media malaise –or videomalaise– theories) and recent reinterpretations that 
argue the opposite: namely the political mobilization approach5. 
 
 
2.1. Media Malaise Theories  
 
The process by which media malaise theories emerged is somewhat imprecise. 
Undoubtedly, the origins of these interpretations are found in the reflections of Kurt Lang 
                                                 
3 Cfr. NORRIS, Pippa (ed.), Critical Citizens, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999; NYE, Joseph, 
“Conclusion: Reflections, Conjectures, and Puzzles”, in NYE, Joseph, ZELIKOW, Phillip & KING, David, 
Why People don’t Trust Government, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1997, pp. 253-281. 
4 Within this approach we can find other theories such as agenda-setting or persuasion theories. 
5 Throughout the chapter we find the terms “demobilization”, “media malaise” and “videomalaise” 
theories. Except for the small nuances referred to in the text, they are used here as synonyms. 
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and Gladys Lang6. They were the first to suggest connections between the rise of news 
channels and the increased feeling of disengagement from politics in the United States. 
From their point of view, the form which television covered news about politics could 
affect the fundamental orientations of the electorate towards public institutions, including 
the Government. Television programs, they argued, emphasized conflicting elements of 
the political process7, which fed public cynicism. However, this analysis was sidelined at 
the time, in part because the consensus of political communication studies then was that 
the media had only minimal effects on public opinion8. 
Henceforth, a new set of considerations increasingly began to take place and challenge 
the dominant paradigm of the 1960s. The idea that the media had more weight than had 
been measured so far started to take stronger shape among a growing number of 
publications. Paul Weaver, for example, claimed that television news formats fostered 
indifference (at best) or cynical rejection (at worst) to national institutions9. 
The year of 1976 was vital in the development and subsequent consolidation of malaise 
theories. It was then that Michael Robinson popularized the term videomalaise, in an 
influential research that took shape in the article entitled "Public Affairs Television and 
the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of The Selling of the Pentagon"10. The analysis 
present in Robinson’s article constitutes the first accurate theoretical concept developed 
rapidly after the realization of an empirical work –that combines experimental methods 
and statistical data analysis techniques. The author pointed out six interrelated factors in 
order to explain the growth of videomalaise11: (i) the anomalous magnitude and shape of 
television audience; (ii) public perceptions of credibility of programs; (iii) the 
interpretative nature of news coverage; (iv) the emphasis on negative news reports; (v) 
emphasis on conflict and violence reports; and (vi) anti-institutional bias of television 
news programs. All these elements came together in promoting widespread political 
disaffection, frustration, cynicism and malaise. 
Therefore, far from informing and mobilizing the public, media coverage promotes 
public cynicism and political apathy, say these media malaise theorists. Exposure to news 
media limits learning about politics, erodes trust in political leaders and in government 
institutions, as well as reduces political mobilization: “videomalaise theories argue that 
the dominant values and structural biases of the news media produce campaign coverage 
                                                 
6 Cfr. LANG, Kurt & LANG, Gladys, “The Mass Media and Voting”, in BERELSON, Bernard & 
JANOWITZ, Morris (eds.), Reader in Public Opinion and Communication, Free Press, New York, 1966, 
pp. 455-472. 
7 Cfr. MAIER, Jurgen, Politikverdrossenheit in Deutschland. Dimensionen - Determinanten – 
Konsequenzen, Leske + Budrich, Opladen, 2000, pp. 79-80. 
8 Cfr. NORRIS, Pippa, A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Postindustrial Societies, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2000b, p.5. 
9 Cfr. WEAVER, Paul, “Is Television News Biased?”, Public Interest, nº 26, 1972, p. 74. 
10 The discussion between the terms and media malaise and videomalaise are due simply to the outlet that 
dominated during the different periods in the evolution of political communication. When Michael 
Robinson coined the term videomalaise, he did nothing but acknowledge the role of television in the media 
landscape studies of the seventies and early eighties. Subsequent contributions have chosen to use media 
malaise, a more comprehensive term, with the intention acknowledging the significance of other media 
such as print media in this process of political disengagement. 
11 Cfr. ROBINSON, Michael, “Public affairs television and the growth of political malaise: The case of The 
Selling the Pentagon”, American Political Science Review, vol. 70, Issue 3, 1976, p. 426. 
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dominated by the poll-led horse race, personal scandals, and cynical insider strategy, at 
the expense of detailed and informed debate about serious policy problems”12. 
This perspective –which can be considered well consolidated in the late 1980s and early 
1990s– has particular applicability in the American political context. The main studies 
that provided the theoretical robustness of media malaise positions reflected mainly on 
U.S. media13. 
In summary, media malaise theories maintain two central assumptions: that (i) the 
processes of political communication have a significant impact on citizens' civic 
engagement and that (ii) this impact occurs in a negative direction. In other words, the 
lack of social engagement with the political process is determined by the process of 
political communication. 
 
 
2.2. Mobilization Theories 
 
The approach proposed by media malaise theories is contested by a set of scientific 
publications, whose results have been grouped under the label of what has been called 
political mobilization theories. While it is true these new interpretations haven’t 
completely contradicted the previous contribution, they do propose substantial nuances 
that challenge the central argument of videomalaise. Like media malaise theories, they 
suggest that contemporary media have a significant impact on the public. On the other 
hand, the alternative interpretation is that this influence flows in a positive direction, i.e., 
maintaining and promoting civic engagement. 
Political mobilization theories appear on the academic scene with great influence in the 
1990s14 following the publication of more or less specific research findings. The first 
works in this line are a consequence of challenging the hypotheses of media malaise. 
Therefore, it can be said that mobilization theories are a more or less direct result of 
falsification of most of the underlying assumptions proposed by videomalaise theories. 
In some way or another, what this interpretation proposes is that when some analytical 
categories are differentiated, it is possible to reach the conclusion that media malaise 
theories are not applicable as they are formulated. Basically, the core assumption is to 
distinguish between positive and negative effects of different media, messages, audiences 
and effects15. In this sense, for example, regular consumers of TV news and readers of the 
press are more likely to be well informed, interested and committed to political life. By 
contrast, citizens who are exposed to sensationalist programs often have high levels of 
disaffection, cynicism, and political alienation. 
                                                 
12 NORRIS, Pippa, CURTICE, John, SANDERS, et. al., On Message: Communicating the Campaign, 
SAGE Publications, London, 1999, pp. 97-98. 
13 Cfr. CAPPELLA, Joseph & JAMIESON, Kathleen, op. cit.; ROBINSON, Michael, op. cit.; FALLOWS, 
James, Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American Democracy, Pantheon, New York, 1996; 
PATTERSON, Thomas, Out of Order, Knopf, New York, 1993; POSTMAN, Neil, Amusing Ourselves to 
Death, Methuen, London, 1985; SCHUDSON, Michael, The power of news, University Press Cambridge, 
Harvard, 1995. 
14 Cfr. HOLTZ-BACHA, Christina, “Videomalaise Revisited: Media Exposure and Political Alienation in 
West Germany”, European Journal of Communication, March 1990, 5, pp.73-85; NEWTON, Kenneth, op. 
cit.; NORRIS, Pippa, CURTICE, John, SANDERS, et. al., op. cit. 
15 Cfr. NORRIS, Pippa, CURTICE, John, SANDERS, et. al., op. cit. 
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Finally, it is important to mention the importance of a theory that, although framed within 
mobilization perspectives, distinguishes itself advancing a number of developments 
compared to the more generic propositions: the virtuous circle theory16. Despite 
proposing a similar approach as other political mobilization contributions, virtuous circle 
theory (proposed by political scientist Pippa Norris) takes a step further and provides a 
more complete theoretical elaboration. After examining empirical evidence derived from 
data analysis of the U.S. and Western Europe, one of the main conclusions of the virtuous 
circle lies in affirming that attention to news in general (and specifically on television) 
does not contribute to the erosion of diffuse support for the political system. On the 
Contrary, those consistently exposed to news and election campaigns are more 
knowledgeable, more trusting of the government and the political system and more likely 
to participate in electoral campaigns. 
In short, Pippa Norris states that the process of political communication can be 
understood as a virtuous circle, since –in the long-term– it reinforces activism of 
individuals. Indeed, when thinking about the process as a circle –a spiral– we can speak 
of a double directionality: the more informed politically, the most trusting and most 
participatory, are more exposed to media coverage of public affairs; those more exposed 
to media coverage of public affairs, in turn, become more engaged in the political system.  
 
 
3. Case Studies: Spain and Brazil 
 
The explanation of the increase in negative news and political scandals coverage as way 
to understand the loss of trust in institutions is quite common. However, the use of 
comparative data between countries is not so frequent. Thus, the objective in this article 
is to compare two countries: Spain and Brazil. Although sharing similar cultural 
characteristics, these two cases also present palpable differences. Therefore, the approach 
can provide interesting information about the issue. 
Brazil's political culture is often described as having strong Iberian roots. That is, a 
system of authoritarian, and hierarchical values, combined with "statist" and "illiberal" 
components resulting from the formation process of the Brazilian State17. The Brazilian 
political system, in its turn, is characterized by a strong executive. The 1988 Constitution 
–which reopened the democratic period in Brazil)– has institutionalized a system 
centered on the executive and party leaders that ensure governability through the 
delegation of power it receives from the parliamentary majority of government coalitions, 
similar to a parliamentary system. The description of the countries political system often 
includes the association of a plebiscitarian presidential system with federalism, electoral 
rules that combine open lists of candidates with proportional representation, a weak and 
fragmented multiparty system and the formation of large coalitions based on 
heterogeneous political forces18. 
                                                 
16 Cfr. NORRIS, Pippa, A Virtuous Circle…, op. cit. 
17 Cfr. MOISÉS, José, Os Brasileiros e a Democracia. Bases sócio-políticas da legitimidade democrática, 
Ática, São Paulo, 1995. 
18 Cfr. MOISÉS, José, “Cultura Política, Instituições e Democracia. Lições da experiência brasileira”, in 
MOISÉS, José, (org.). Democracia e Confiança: por que os cidadãos desconfiam das instituições 
públicas?, Edusp, São Paulo, 2010, pp. 77-121. 
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Therefore, with a multiparty system in which the party with the most seats usually not 
exceeding 20%, it means a coalition government with a large number of parties. Thus, 
unlike the Spanish parliamentary system –in which dissatisfaction with the government 
tends to fall into the largest party in power– in Brazil, due to this fragmentation of the 
parties and the presidential system, there is a greater segmentation of dissatisfaction 
between the executive and parliament. 
The landscape of the media in Brazil, compared with that of Spain, is characterized by a 
higher prevalence of electronic media. There is a significant penetration of this medium 
(comparable to more developed countries), with low educational levels and a high 
illiteracy rate. While in Spain newspaper circulation reaches 144,48 per thousand 
inhabitants, in Brazil the figure is only 35,5519. Despite its low circulation, the press in 
Brazil plays an active role in exposing corruption scandals and in setting the agenda for 
other media such as television, besides being a “niche” reference for more educated 
citizens and opinion formers. Newspaper readership in Brazil is characterized by 
cumulation and overlapping. Of those who read newspapers at least once a week, 83% 
also say they see the country's main television news program (Jornal Nacional) at least 
once a week, while the reverse is not so common: Only 45% of those who state watching 
this newscast at least once a week, read newspapers the same frequency20. 
In turn, in 2008, television was seen in Spain 3h 43m on average21. In Brazil, in the same 
year, the daily consumption reached 5h 08m22. In terms of news consumption, all this 
influence is controlled by almost a single company: Globo Network. Its main newscast, 
Jornal Nacional, has almost 70% of the audience, the equivalent of 31 million viewers23, 
a significant figure if compared with the numbers of Spain, where the audience for this 
type of program is more divided between the different networks and the most watched 
newscast is less than one third of that number, displaying a greater competition between 
media companies. In a survey on the perception of media in several countries, 52% of 
Brazilians spontaneously cited Globo as the most reliable news source24. These data are 
expressive, especially when considering the importance of television in Brazil –as shown 
here (high penetration, with low educational levels of the population)– and also the fact 
that trust in media is considered as a factor for the public accepting or not the “mediated 
climate of opinion”25. 
At the same time, institutional trust in Brazil is very low. The proportion of Brazilians 
who trust government is a little more than a third, while confidence in political parties is 
less than a fifth. In Spain, the numbers of trust in parliament are higher –reaching about 
                                                 
19 Cfr. UIS, UNESCO, 2004. 
20 Cfr. MENEGUELLO, Rachel. “Aspectos do Desempenho Democrático. Estudo sobre a adesão à 
democracia e avaliação do regime”, in MOISÉS, José (org.). Democracia e Confiança: por que os cidadãos 
desconfiam das instituições públicas?, Edusp, São Paulo, 2010, pp 123-148. 
21 Cfr. WERT, José, Los Medios en España: materiales para un debate, Fundación Ciudadanía y Valores, 
2009. 
22 Cfr. IBOPE MÍDIA, Media workstation, Painel Nacional de Televisão (PNT), 2008. 
23 Cfr.  Veja, September, 2004, [online] Available: 
http://veja.abril.com.br/acervodigital/home.aspx?cod=JMOMOOCQMRC  
24 Cfr. “Media More Trusted than Governments” Poll, Globescan, [online] Available 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/02_05_06mediatrust.pdf, 2006. 
25 Cfr. TSAFATI, Yariv, “Media skepticism and climate of opinion perception”, International Journal of 
Public Opinion Research, 15(1), 2003, 65-82.  
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half the population– while confidence in political parties reach one third, as shown on 
table 1. On a scale constructed from seven attitudes towards public institutions, Spain lies 
ahead of Brazil, reaching to 60.9, while Brazil came to 57,226. 
Thus, despite certain cultural similarities shared by Spain and Brazil, there are 
considerable differences both in relation to the level of media consumption, as well as the 
rate of institutional trust. How do these differences translate into the relationship between 
these two dimensions? Is the role of the media for citizens’ attitudes toward democratic 
institutions in both countries similar, or are there differences caused by the diverse 
characteristics outlined above? In this study, we examined the relationship of media 
consumption with institutional confidence in Brazil and Spain. More specifically, we 
investigate how consumption of general information on television and in newspapers has 
an impact on trust in democratic institutions of both countries27. 
Thus, in line with mobilization theory, we argue that the consumption of television news 
has the ability to increase information regarding performance of democratic institutions. 
In this regard: 
H1: Consuming news on television is associated with greater institutional trust in both 
countries. 
On the other hand, the consumption of news in the papers may have different 
associations. The low readership in Brazil also means greater audience segmentation, 
which has a higher accumulation of information obtained from other means. Thus, this 
"niche" may represent the "critical citizen" of Norris28. That is, the more informed 
citizens who are more suspicious and more critical of the performance of the regime: 
H2: As television news consumption, in Spain the consumption of information in 
newspapers is associated with a greater confidence in institutions.  
On the other hand; 
H3: Newspapers readership is associated with lower levels of confidence in Brazil. 
 
 
 
4. Results 
 
In Brazil, as noted above, the medium most commonly used by people is television. The 
most watched newscast Brazilians use to obtain information is Jornal Nacional, from 
Globo Network. Therefore, as an independent variable, the audience for this particular 
                                                 
26 Cfr. NORRIS, Pippa, Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2011. All indicators are standardized to 100 points of the scales, to facilitate comparison, and 
derived from the fifth wave of the WVS (2005-7). 
27 For Brazil, we used data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (2008) for data about the press 
(statistical treatment and interpretation of data, however, are ours). For data about newscast, “Citizens’ 
Distrust Survey (2006)” was used. Both surveys used national probability sample design of voting-age 
adults. “Citizens’ Distrust Survey (2006)”: 2,004 interviews. Lapop survey (2008): 1,497 people. The 
sample was stratified by regions (north, northeastern, mid-west, southeastern and south) and by urban and 
rural areas. www.lapopsurveys.org. For Spain, we used data from the European Social Survey 2008-09 (4th 
Wave), which surveyed 2,576 people over 15 years of age, residents in Spain (including Melilla and Ceuta), 
regardless of their nationality, citizenship or language. Despite the different databases, the similarities in the 
variables used allow comparisons. 
28Cfr. NORRIS, Pippa (ed.), Critical Citizens…, op. cit, 
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newscast was chosen. Those who watch JN are also exposed to other messages and 
content on television. It seems reasonable to suppose that there is a difference between 
individuals who watch JN three times a week –while seeing only one hour of TV a day– 
and another person who watches the same amount of JN, but at the same time has a four 
hour daily consumption of television. Thus, we used a JN viewership rate, which 
corresponds to the proportion of consumption of the newscast in relation to the total 
number of hours devoted to television, created by a division between JN viewership by 
TV viewership. 
The idea is not only a possible "dilution" of information compared to information that is 
more "pure". It is expected that spectators who practically restrict their consumption to 
television news, have a closer relationship to their content, as they turn on their TV set 
with the express purpose of watching the news of the day. However, a different pattern of 
viewership, in which the individual turns on his TV as he arrives from work until bedtime 
–watching the newscast "between the telenovelas (soap operas)"– may indicate that they 
are less aware of content, what is treated as a difference between consumption and 
exposure by some analysts. This created variable was more consistent –compared to 
single newscast viewership– in a previous study29. The following data show the impact of 
this rate in explaining institutional trust in Brazil, obtained from categorical regression 
analysis and displayed on table 330. 
The data suggest a positive role of television news, according to the hypothesis. Despite 
JN not having any association to confidence in the Brazilian parliament or political 
parties, television news was positively correlated to trust in the judiciary and the 
government. The results are consistent with those observed by Norris and Newton31 for 
the British case, i.e., consumption of information, television or newspapers, promoting 
institutional trust. 
In the case of Spain, also displayed on table 3, there is no significant relationship between 
consumption of television news media and institutional trust. In fact, this is perfectly 
compatible with mobilization theories. The main argument of these studies is that there 
isn’t necessarily a relationship between media consumption variables and political 
engagement dimensions –in this case institutional trust. What it points out is that when 
there is a significant association, it flows in a positive direction. In this case, although 
bivariate correlations may present some statistical significance, when more complex and 
multivariate analysis models are introduced, this relationship is diluted, not presenting 
any significant correlation coefficient. 
For models with the press, we used the independent variable of newspaper readership 
frequency. It was expected that, in Brazil, a smaller and more segmented public with 
higher levels of information, would result in a more critical public, who would have 
greater expectations from the system and, therefore, display less trust in institutions. In 
fact, it is what the results on table 4 show. 
Unlike some of the literature that sees journalism, especially the press, with a more 
positive role for citizens’ attitudes towards politics, in Brazil results are more complex, 
                                                 
29 Cfr. MESQUITA, Nuno, “Jornal Nacional, Democracia e Confiança nas Instituições Democráticas”, in 
MOISÉS, José (org.), Democracia e Confiança: por que os cidadãos desconfiam das instituições 
públicas?, Edusp, São Paulo, 2010, pp. 185-216. 
30 Optimal Scaling in SPSS. 
31 Cfr. NORRIS, Pippa, A Virtuous Circle…, op. cit.; NEWTON, Kenneth, op. cit. 
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depending on the medium used for information. While its main news program on 
television fosters confidence in institutions, the same can’t be said of the press. Although 
there was no correlation between newspaper readership and trust in political parties, 
exposure to information in the press is negatively associated with trust in other 
institutions: the Brazilian parliament, the justice system and the government. As proposed 
in the initial hypothesis, this result is believed to derive from a “niche” consumer, who is 
more informed and more critical of government performance, the "critical citizen" of 
Norris32. In the case of Spain, like the case of television, print media consumption of 
political information did not prove to be a good predictor of institutional trust. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The way in which exposure to the media intervenes in some dimensions of political 
culture –in this case, institutional trust– has been a constant in political communication 
research. In recent decades we have witnessed a proliferation of academic papers –as well 
as less empirical speculation on this subject– having accumulated many different 
conclusions on the matter. Some theorists have pointed out a negative influence of the 
daily routine of the media on dimensions of political engagement. Others have pointed to 
the opposite direction, the potential of exposure to political information to foster more 
positive attitudes toward the regime. Further studies have introduced exceptions, 
exemptions and other particularities on this complex relationship. Our study attempts to 
deepen the debate that has been generated around this controversial issue. Using a 
comparative approach to the specific study of institutional trust as a concrete variable of 
political culture, we have gone a step further in the discussion. 
Our Hypothesis 1 stated that television news consumption was associated with greater 
institutional confidence in both countries. In the case of Brazil, it occurs that way, while 
in Spain there is no clear relationship in either direction. Hypothesis 2, on the other hand, 
proposed that in Spain the consumption of information in newspapers was associated 
with a greater confidence in institutions, which was not verified with the statistical 
analysis provided. As consumptions of news on TV, the press is not a good predictor of 
institutional trust in Spain. Finally, Hypothesis 3 stated that newspapers readership is 
associated with lower levels of confidence in Brazil. This hypothesis was verified as it 
was formulated. 
The most plausible explanation for these differences comes from Brazilian and Spanish 
peculiarities, both in relation to the political system and its design as well as their media 
system configuration, more specifically the specificities of print media readers. Given the 
configuration of the dedicated reader in Brazil (well-educated, knowledgeable of the 
political system, with high expectations, and, therefore, critical), as our data show, it was 
expected that these individuals –certainly a minority elite– had less confidence in 
institutions given their high expectations. The case of the reader in Spain, while 
displaying higher levels of education, does not present such a distinguished character, 
which could possibly explain the differences. 
                                                 
32 Cfr. NORRIS, Pippa (ed.), Critical Citizens…, op. cit, 
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Those findings mentioned before are absolutely coherent with previous studies in Spain 
and its European context33.  
To conclude, we can argue that this opens the discussion regarding the aspects involved 
in the relationship between media and political culture. In many cases, it has been 
assumed that all countries produce the same effect associations. On the opposite 
direction, this study seems to corroborate that comparative studies may reflect behavioral 
patterns between variables under study that are very diverse –in line with what was 
pointed by Hallin and Mancini in 2004– producing diverse roles for the media in different 
countries. 
 
Tables 
Table 1. Institutional Trust Spain-Brazil. Citizens that manifest having “some” or “a lot” 
of trust in institutions 
 Government Parliament Parties 
Brazil 46,20% 24,90% 21,00% 
Spain 35,10% 50,80% 28,50% 
Average WVS 45,80% 36,20% 24,30% 
Source: World Values Survey (WVS), wave 5, 1981-2008. (Brazil: 2006; Spain: 2007). 
http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp 
 
Table 2. Media Consumption Spain-Brazil. Citizens who state having consulted media 
previous week. 
 Press TV & Radio 
Brazil 36,10% 86,10% 
Spain 63,10% 90,70% 
Average WVS 48,10% 88,20% 
Source: World Values Survey (WVS), wave 5, 1981-2008. (Brazil: 2006; Spain: 2007). 
http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp 
 
Table 3. Newscast and Trust in Institutions. Significance: *p < 0,10, **p < 0,05, 
***<0,01. ns: not significant. Brazil: N= 2004. 
JN rate (Brazil) and TV news consumption (Spain) Regression Coefficients (beta)
controlled by socioeconomic variables (sex, age, education, income) 
BRAZIL Parliament Political Parties Judiciary Government 
jn  ns ns 0,04* 0,046** 
R2   0,02 0,027 
SPAIN Parliament Political Parties Judiciary Government 
Newscast ns ns ns ns 
R2     
Source: “Citizens Distrust in Democratic Institutions” (2006). Spain: N= 2,576; source: 
ESS, 2008-09. 
                                                 
33Cfr. LUENGO, Oscar, ¿Comunicando Desafección? La influencia de los medios en la cultura política, 
Fontamara/EGAP, Mexico, 2009; RODRÍGUEZ-VIRGILI, Jordi, LÓPEZ-ESCOBAR, Esteban & TOLSA, 
Antonio, “La percepción pública de los políticos, los partidos y la política, y uso de medios de 
comunicación”, Comunicación y Sociedad, Vol XXIV, nº 2, 2011, pp. 7-39. 
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Table 4. Newspaper readership and Trust in Institutions. Significance: *p < 0,10, **p < 
0,05, ***<0,01. Brazil: N= 1,497. 
Newspaper Readership Regression Coefficients (beta) controlled by socioeconomic
variables (sex, age, education, income) 
BRAZIL Parliament Political Parties Justice Government 
Newspapers -0,099*** ns -0,068** -0,126*** 
R2 0,034  0,047 0,053 
SPAIN Parliament Political Parties Justice Government 
Newspapers ns  -0,058* ns ns 
R2   0,006   
Source: Lapop (2008). Spain: N= 2,576; source: ESS, 2008-09. 
 
Appendix. Measures and Coding 
Lapop (2008) Survey: 
Newspaper readership: “How often do you read newspapers (everyday, once or twice a 
week, rarely, never).” 
Institutional Trust: “Up to what point do you trust: the Judiciary, Congress, Federal 
Government, Political parties (not at all, 2, 3, 4, 5 ,6, a lot)” 
“Citizens’ Distrust in Democratic Institutions” (2006) Survey: 
TV viewership: "How many hours a day do you spend watching TV (up to 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
hours, more than 5 hours? Or you do not usually watch TV?)" 
Jornal Nacional viewership : "How often do you watch TV Globo's Jornal Nacional 
during the week? (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 times, every day or you never watch JN?) " 
Institutional Trust: “I am going to mention now some public organs/institutions and 
would like to know what is the degree of trust that you have for each one of them: the 
Judiciary, Congress, Federal Government, Political parties (a lot, some, a little or no trust 
at all).” 
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